（美）喬治·F·凱南 著 張小明 譯

【譯者說明】凱南是美國政治現(xiàn)實(shí)主義的代表人之一。《蘇聯(lián)行為的根源》發(fā)表在《外交季刊》1947年7月號(hào)，因署名X，故有“X論文”之稱。X論文提出了著名的“遏制”戰(zhàn)略，是喬治·凱南第一個(gè)公開發(fā)表的、闡述其政治現(xiàn)實(shí)主義思想的著述。雖發(fā)表的時(shí)間較久，但仍有一定的參考價(jià)值。

【作者背景簡(jiǎn)介】

喬治·凱南（George Frost Kennan，1904年2月16日 – 2005年3月17日）是美國著名的外交家和歷史學(xué)家，曾任美國駐蘇代辦、大使，后在美國普林斯頓大學(xué)任教，出版了17本著作，其中兩部獲得普利策獎(jiǎng)。凱南是美國對(duì)蘇實(shí)行“遏制政策”的創(chuàng)始人，對(duì)美國在二戰(zhàn)后對(duì)蘇聯(lián)外交政策的制定具有重要的影響。

凱南的一生跨越了整個(gè)20世紀(jì)，經(jīng)歷了兩次世界大戰(zhàn)以及美蘇冷戰(zhàn)，其一生的主要時(shí)間和經(jīng)歷都被耗在處理美國對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的外交事務(wù)以及對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的研究上。1925年，凱南畢業(yè)于普林斯頓大學(xué)，1929年至1931年在柏林大學(xué)學(xué)習(xí)俄羅斯文化，后在蘇聯(lián)和歐洲國家從事外交工作。1946年2月22日，任駐蘇聯(lián)代辦的喬治·凱南向美國國務(wù)院發(fā)了一封長達(dá)8000字的電文，對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的內(nèi)部社會(huì)和對(duì)外政策進(jìn)行了深入分析，提出并最終被美國政府所采納的對(duì)付蘇聯(lián)的長期戰(zhàn)略，也就是遏制政策，對(duì)20世紀(jì)后半葉的世界政治產(chǎn)生了重大影響。

一

我們今天所看到的蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)的政治性格是意識(shí)形態(tài)和環(huán)境的產(chǎn)物：蘇聯(lián)現(xiàn)今領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人從產(chǎn)生他們政治背景的那個(gè)運(yùn)動(dòng)中繼承下來的意識(shí)形態(tài)和他們?cè)诙韲鴪?zhí)掌已近三十年的政權(quán)的環(huán)境。很少有心理分析的工作比弄清這兩種因素的相互作用及每個(gè)因素在決定蘇聯(lián)行為中的地位這個(gè)工作更難的了。盡管如此，為了理解和有效地對(duì)付蘇聯(lián)的行為，必須作這樣的努力。

要概括出蘇聯(lián)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人奪取政權(quán)時(shí)所帶著的一整套意識(shí)形態(tài)觀念是困難的。馬克思的理論在俄國共產(chǎn)主義版本中總是在發(fā)生著微妙的變化。作為其理論基礎(chǔ)來源的材料是廣泛而又復(fù)雜的。但是1916年時(shí)，俄國共產(chǎn)主義思想的最主要內(nèi)容可以歸納如下：（a）人類生活的中心因素是物質(zhì)產(chǎn)品的生產(chǎn)和交換制度，它決定社會(huì)生活的性質(zhì)與“社會(huì)面貌”；（b）資本主義的生產(chǎn)方式是罪惡的，它必然導(dǎo)致資本擁有者階級(jí)對(duì)工人階級(jí)的剝削，不能充分發(fā)展社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)和公平地分配勞動(dòng)者創(chuàng)造的物質(zhì)產(chǎn)品；（c）資本主義包含著導(dǎo)致自身毀滅的種子，由于資本擁有者階級(jí)不能適應(yīng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展變化，它必然引起革命和使政權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移到工人階級(jí)手中；（d）作為資本主義最后階段的帝國主義必定導(dǎo)致戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和革命。

其他內(nèi)容可用列寧自己的話來概括：“經(jīng)濟(jì)政治發(fā)展的不平衡是資本主義的絕對(duì)規(guī)律。由此就應(yīng)得出結(jié)論：社會(huì)主義可能首先在少數(shù)或者甚至在單獨(dú)一個(gè)資本主義國家內(nèi)獲得勝利。這個(gè)國家內(nèi)獲得勝利的無產(chǎn)階級(jí)既然剝奪了資本家并在本國組織了社會(huì)主義生產(chǎn)，就會(huì)起來反對(duì)其余的資本主義世界，把其他國家的被壓迫階級(jí)吸引到自己的方面來，……”①應(yīng)當(dāng)指出，他們認(rèn)為如果沒有無產(chǎn)階級(jí)革命，資本主義不會(huì)自行滅亡。為了推翻搖搖欲墜的制度，一定要有來自無產(chǎn)階級(jí)革命運(yùn)動(dòng)的最后推動(dòng)力。這種推動(dòng)力被認(rèn)為遲早是要到來的。

在俄國革命爆發(fā)以前五十多年中，參加革命運(yùn)動(dòng)的人們狂熱地信奉這套思想。由于受挫、不滿、無自我表現(xiàn)的希望（或急于自我表現(xiàn)）以及在沙皇統(tǒng)治制度的嚴(yán)密控制下選擇流血的革命作為改善社會(huì)境況的手段此種行為缺乏廣泛的支持，這些革命家們便在馬克思主義理論中為自己本能的欲望找到了極為方便的理論依據(jù)。馬克思主義理論為他們煩躁情緒、全盤否定沙皇制度下的價(jià)值觀、追求權(quán)力的欲望和雪恥心理以及尋求捷徑實(shí)現(xiàn)這些愿望的傾向提供了違反科學(xué)的理論根據(jù)。因此毫不奇怪，他們堅(jiān)信馬克思列寧主義教義是千真萬確、合理有效的，因?yàn)檫@一教義迎合他們那種易沖動(dòng)，激情感的心理。沒必要懷疑他們的虔誠。這是和人性本身一樣久的現(xiàn)象。愛德華特·吉本②說得最精辟不過了，他在《羅馬帝國的衰亡史》中這樣寫道：“篤信到欺騙，這一步是非常危險(xiǎn)而又不知不覺的；圣賢蘇格拉底告訴我們，聰明的人可能為自己欺騙，善良的人可能愚弄他人，人的良心正是處于自我幻覺和有意欺騙的混和的中間狀態(tài)。”正是帶著這一整套觀念，布爾什維克黨奪取了政權(quán)。

應(yīng)當(dāng)指出，在整個(gè)準(zhǔn)備革命的時(shí)期，這些人的注意力，跟馬克思本人一樣③，更多的放在擊敗競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手而非今后社會(huì)主義所采取的形式上，在他們看來，前者先于后者。一旦掌權(quán)，他們對(duì)應(yīng)該實(shí)施的綱領(lǐng)的看法很大部分一上是模糊的、空想的和不切實(shí)際的。除了工業(yè)國有化和剝奪私人大資本外，沒有一致的綱領(lǐng)方針。他們對(duì)待農(nóng)民的辦法（根據(jù)馬克思主義的公式不同于對(duì)待無產(chǎn)階級(jí)）在俄國共產(chǎn)主義思想中就是一個(gè)含糊不清的問題，在共產(chǎn)黨執(zhí)政的最初十年中，一直是一個(gè)引起爭(zhēng)論、舉棋不定的問題。

革命后最初一段時(shí)期的環(huán)境一一內(nèi)戰(zhàn)、外來干涉以及共產(chǎn)主義者僅僅代表著俄國人民中極少的一部分——這使得必須建立獨(dú)裁政權(quán)。“戰(zhàn)時(shí)共產(chǎn)主義”和過急消滅私人生產(chǎn)與私人商業(yè)造成了不良的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果、招來了對(duì)新生政權(quán)更多的敵視。暫時(shí)緩慢俄國的共產(chǎn)主義化過程是以新經(jīng)濟(jì)政策為標(biāo)志，減緩了某些經(jīng)濟(jì)困難，達(dá)到了一定目的。然而它也表明，“社會(huì)中的資本主義因素”總是設(shè)法從政府放松政策中謀取好處，如果允許其繼續(xù)存在的話，他們始終是威脅蘇維埃政權(quán)的強(qiáng)大的反對(duì)力量與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。個(gè)體農(nóng)民的情況也類似，盡管力量很少，他們亦屬私有生產(chǎn)者。

如果列寧在世的話，為著俄國社會(huì)的最終利益，他或許會(huì)以偉人的氣魄調(diào)和這些相沖突的力量，當(dāng)然我們不能確定他真的會(huì)這樣做。即使列寧會(huì)這樣做，斯大林及其在爭(zhēng)奪列寧繼承權(quán)斗爭(zhēng)中的追隨者們也不會(huì)容忍他們所凱覷的政權(quán)下存在著競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的政治力量。他們的不安全感太強(qiáng)烈了。他們那種特有的極度強(qiáng)烈的狂熱性和戒備心理與盎格魯——撒克遜的妥協(xié)傳統(tǒng)格格不入，使得不可能實(shí)行長久的分權(quán)。從孕育他們的俄羅斯——亞細(xì)亞世界，他們形成了對(duì)于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力量長久地和平共處的可能性極度懷疑的心理。由于輕信自己教義的正確性，他們總是堅(jiān)持競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力量或屈從我或被消滅。共產(chǎn)黨之外的俄國社會(huì)本身并不僵化。人們的任何形式的共同行為與組織皆受黨的操縱。在俄國，不允許存在其他具有活力與感召力的組織。只有黨具有嚴(yán)密的組織結(jié)構(gòu)。除了黨之外，便是無組織無目的的雜亂的群眾。

蘇聯(lián)黨內(nèi)，情況亦如此。黨員群眾雖然可能參加選舉，參與制訂、討論和執(zhí)行政策，但是他們參加這些活動(dòng)時(shí)并不是從自己的意愿出發(fā)，而是要仰上級(jí)黨的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的鼻息，揣摸“指示”的含義。

應(yīng)當(dāng)再次強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，這些人搞專制主觀上或許并不是出于個(gè)人的目的。他們無疑相信——并且很容易這樣相信一一自己知道什么是于社會(huì)有益的，一旦權(quán)力獲得穩(wěn)固和不可改變的地位，就會(huì)努力為社會(huì)謀福利。為了達(dá)到權(quán)力穩(wěn)固的目的，他們不顧上帝規(guī)條與人類道德；不擇一切手段。只有等到他們覺得安全時(shí)，才會(huì)開始考慮如何使信賴自己的人民過得幸福與舒適。

關(guān)于蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)最突出的環(huán)境即，迄今為止，該政權(quán)的政治鞏固過程尚未完成，克里姆林宮的人還深陷于鞏固和強(qiáng)化他們?cè)?917年所獲得的政權(quán)之斗爭(zhēng)中。他們這樣做的主要目的是對(duì)付俄國內(nèi)部的反對(duì)勢(shì)力，但也有對(duì)付外部世界的意圖。因?yàn)橐庾R(shí)形態(tài)教導(dǎo)它們，外部世界是敵視蘇聯(lián)的，最終推翻境外的政治勢(shì)力是他們的歷史使命。俄國的歷史與傳統(tǒng)支持了他們的這種認(rèn)識(shí)。最后，他們自己挑釁性的不妥協(xié)行動(dòng)惹來了外部世界的反應(yīng)。于是他們，用吉本的另一句話來說，又被迫應(yīng)付自己所挑起的敵對(duì)行為。通過把外部世界描繪成自己的敵人從而證明自己正確，這是每個(gè)人所具有的、無可否認(rèn)的特權(quán)；因?yàn)槿绻?jīng)常地、反復(fù)地這么認(rèn)為并將之作自己的行為基礎(chǔ)，那么他必定是正確的。

由于他們精神世界和意識(shí)形態(tài)的特點(diǎn)，蘇聯(lián)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人從不承認(rèn)敵對(duì)他們的行為含有合理的、正義的因素。這種敵對(duì)行為，從理論上說，只能來自反動(dòng)的、頑固的和垂死的資本主義。只要官方承認(rèn)俄國尚存資本主義的殘余，這就可以被當(dāng)作維持獨(dú)裁政權(quán)的原因。但是，當(dāng)這些殘余開始逐漸消失，獨(dú)裁政權(quán)之合理性就越來越站不住腳了，而且當(dāng)官方正式宣稱這些殘余已被最后清除之后，其存在之合理依據(jù)就完全喪失了。這促使蘇聯(lián)統(tǒng)治集團(tuán)采取新的手法，因?yàn)槎韲巡淮嬖谫Y本主義，同時(shí)又不允許處于其統(tǒng)治下的人民自發(fā)產(chǎn)生的嚴(yán)重的與廣泛的異己力量之存在，這樣就有必要通過強(qiáng)調(diào)國外資本主義的威脅，為繼續(xù)維持獨(dú)裁制度提供合法依據(jù)。

這種做法很早就己開始。1924年，斯大林特別指出，維持“鎮(zhèn)壓機(jī)關(guān)”（主要指軍隊(duì)和秘密警察）是因?yàn)椤爸灰嬖谫Y本主義的包圍，就有被干涉的危險(xiǎn)和由此引起的一切后果。”根據(jù)這種理論，從那時(shí)起，俄國國內(nèi)的一切反對(duì)力量均被描述為敵視蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)的國外反動(dòng)勢(shì)力的代理人。

同樣地，他們極力強(qiáng)調(diào)社會(huì)主義和資本主義世界存在著根本的對(duì)抗這一共產(chǎn)主義觀點(diǎn)。

許多事實(shí)證明，這是毫無根據(jù)的。由于一方面國外確實(shí)存在由蘇聯(lián)哲學(xué)與行為所引起的敵視心理，另一方面歷史上某些時(shí)候軍事強(qiáng)國特別是三十年代的納粹德國和日本確實(shí)有侵略蘇聯(lián)的計(jì)劃，真實(shí)的情況被掩蓋了。但事實(shí)上，莫斯科強(qiáng)調(diào)面臨著外部世界對(duì)蘇聯(lián)社會(huì)的威脅，并不是因?yàn)檎嬗衼碜試獾臄骋暤默F(xiàn)實(shí)，而是為了給維持國內(nèi)獨(dú)裁制度制造借口。

因此，維護(hù)蘇聯(lián)現(xiàn)政權(quán)即在國內(nèi)建立至高無上的權(quán)威，和由此而來的編造外國敵視的神話，這一切決定了我們今天所看到的蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)機(jī)器的特征。未能適應(yīng)上述目的的國內(nèi)機(jī)關(guān)逐漸被裁減與取締，反之則不斷膨脹。蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)的安全是建立在黨的鐵的紀(jì)律、無所不在和嚴(yán)厲殘暴的秘密警察以及牢固的國家經(jīng)濟(jì)壟斷的基礎(chǔ)上的。蘇聯(lián)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人得以對(duì)付競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力量以求得安全的“鎮(zhèn)壓機(jī)關(guān)”，很大程度上成了人民（他們應(yīng)當(dāng)服務(wù)的對(duì)象）的太上皇。今天，蘇聯(lián)主要政權(quán)機(jī)關(guān)的任務(wù)是完善獨(dú)裁制度和在民眾中維持這么一種觀念，即俄國處于包圍之中，敵人就在城墻下。組成權(quán)力機(jī)構(gòu)的上百萬官僚們必須盡一切努力在人民中維持這種觀念，否則他們自己就是多余的了。

從目前看來，俄國統(tǒng)治者不會(huì)取消鎮(zhèn)壓機(jī)關(guān)。建立專制政權(quán)的過程己經(jīng)進(jìn)行了近三十年，這在當(dāng)代是空前的（至少從范圍之廣這一點(diǎn)來說），它除了引起國外的敵視外，亦導(dǎo)致了國內(nèi)反抗。警察機(jī)關(guān)強(qiáng)化的結(jié)果，是使反對(duì)政權(quán)的潛在力量越來越強(qiáng)大與危險(xiǎn)。

俄國統(tǒng)治者決不會(huì)放棄他們借以維持獨(dú)裁政權(quán)的神話。因?yàn)檫@個(gè)神話己成蘇聯(lián)哲學(xué)不可分割的一部分，通過比單純的意識(shí)形態(tài)力量還大的紐帶，它己深深地嵌入蘇聯(lián)思想體系之中。

二

前面談了這么多的歷史背景。那么它是如何反映在我們今天所看到的蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)的政治性格上呢？

傳統(tǒng)的意識(shí)形態(tài)理論尚未被放棄。他們?nèi)匀粓?jiān)信資本主義是罪惡的、必然要滅亡的，無產(chǎn)階級(jí)的歷史使命是促使資本主義滅亡，將政權(quán)掌握在自己手中。但他們更多的強(qiáng)調(diào)關(guān)系到蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)本身的一些觀念上，即作為黑暗、誤入歧途的世界中唯一的、真正的社會(huì)主義政權(quán)的地位及其內(nèi)部之權(quán)力關(guān)系。

在這些觀念中，首先他們強(qiáng)調(diào)資本主義與社會(huì)主義之間固有的對(duì)抗。我們己經(jīng)看到，這個(gè)觀念是如此之深地嵌入蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)基礎(chǔ)中。它對(duì)作為國際社會(huì)一員的蘇聯(lián)的行為有著深遠(yuǎn)的影響。這意味著蘇聯(lián)總不可能真正地相信自己與資本主義強(qiáng)國的目標(biāo)有一致的地方。莫斯科總是認(rèn)為，資本主義世界的目的是敵視蘇聯(lián)的，因而也就是違背它所控制的蘇聯(lián)人民的利益的。如果某個(gè)時(shí)候，蘇聯(lián)會(huì)在違背這一觀念的協(xié)議上簽字的話，這只不過是對(duì)付敵手的策略手段而已，蘇聯(lián)的做法是“買主自行當(dāng)心”。蘇聯(lián)人聲稱這種對(duì)抗仍然存在。這是虛構(gòu)的。由此產(chǎn)生了克里姆林宮對(duì)外政策中許多令人迷惑的現(xiàn)象：躲躲閃閃、守口如瓶、欺詐蒙騙、疑心重重以及不懷好意。在可見的將來，這些現(xiàn)象不會(huì)消失。當(dāng)然，其程度與側(cè)重點(diǎn)會(huì)有所不同。當(dāng)蘇聯(lián)人有求于我們時(shí)，上述這種或那種行為會(huì)有所收斂；這種時(shí)候，總有些美國人會(huì)欣喜若狂，認(rèn)為“俄國人變了”，甚至有些人竟以所謂的自己帶來了這種“變化”而居功。我們切不可為策略手段所迷惑。蘇聯(lián)政策的這些特征以及導(dǎo)致其產(chǎn)生的觀念，與蘇聯(lián)內(nèi)部政權(quán)性質(zhì)密切相關(guān)，只要蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)性質(zhì)沒有改變，我們就必然要面對(duì)著這種行為，不管是明示的還是暗示的。

這意味著，在今后很長時(shí)間內(nèi)，蘇聯(lián)仍是很難打交道的。但并不是說，蘇聯(lián)要進(jìn)行你死我活的斗爭(zhēng)，以便在一個(gè)確定的時(shí)間內(nèi)推翻我們的社會(huì)制度。值得慶幸的是，蘇聯(lián)關(guān)于資本主義最終必然滅亡的理論包含這樣一層意思，即它并不急于實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)。進(jìn)步勢(shì)力可以為最后決戰(zhàn)作長期的準(zhǔn)備。在此期間，至關(guān)重要的是，國內(nèi)外的共產(chǎn)主義者應(yīng)當(dāng)熱愛與捍衛(wèi)“社會(huì)主義祖國”——已經(jīng)取得勝利的、作為社會(huì)主義力量中心的蘇維埃社會(huì)主義聯(lián)盟，促進(jìn)她的繁榮，困擾與消滅她的敵人。在國外推行未成熟的、“冒險(xiǎn)的”革命計(jì)劃，會(huì)使莫斯科處境難堪，因此被視為“決不能原諒”甚至是“反革命”的行動(dòng)。莫斯科所定義的社會(huì)主義事業(yè)，就是支持和發(fā)展蘇聯(lián)的力量。

我們?cè)賮砜刺K聯(lián)的第二個(gè)觀念，即克里姆林宮是一貫正確的。在蘇聯(lián)權(quán)力思想中，不允許存在除黨之外的獨(dú)立組織，因此就必須在理論上把黨的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作為真理的唯一源泉。如果其他地方亦有真理的話，那就應(yīng)允許其他組織存在與自由表達(dá)其意志，這是克里姆林宮不能也決不會(huì)允許的。

因此黨的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)總是正確的，甚至自從1929年斯大林通過宣布政治局一致原則從而正式確立他的個(gè)人權(quán)力以來，亦是如此。

由于黨一貫正確，因而便有黨的鐵的紀(jì)律。事實(shí)上，兩者是互為依據(jù)的。建立嚴(yán)格的紀(jì)律需要承認(rèn)黨的一貫正確，黨的一貫正確要求遵守紀(jì)律。兩者一起決定了整個(gè)蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)機(jī)器的行為。如果不考慮第三個(gè)因素，還不足以理解這兩者的作用，即黨為了策略上的考慮，可以在任何時(shí)候隨心所欲地提出某種理論，如果它被認(rèn)為有益于其事業(yè)的話，并且要求全體黨員忠實(shí)地、無條件地接受這種理論。這就是說，真理不是永恒的，它實(shí)際上可以由蘇聯(lián)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人自己根據(jù)需要與目的創(chuàng)造出來。真理可以每周不同、月月有異，它不是絕對(duì)的、不可變更的——非產(chǎn)生于客觀現(xiàn)實(shí)。這僅僅是某些人當(dāng)時(shí)智慧的表白，因?yàn)樗麄兇碇鴼v史的規(guī)律。這些因素造成了蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)機(jī)器的目標(biāo)是僵硬與固執(zhí)的。這種目標(biāo)可由克里姆林宮隨意改變，而其他國家則無法做到這一點(diǎn)。一旦在某個(gè)特定的問題上制定了黨的路線，整個(gè)蘇聯(lián)政府機(jī)構(gòu)包括外交機(jī)關(guān)，就像上滿發(fā)條的玩具汽車沿著既定的方向前進(jìn)，直至遇到不可抗拒的力量才停下來。組成這個(gè)政權(quán)機(jī)器的個(gè)人，不為外來的論點(diǎn)與理由所打動(dòng)。他們受到的全部教育就是教導(dǎo)他們不信任與懷疑外部世界。就像留聲機(jī)前的白狗，他們只聽“主人的聲音”。只有主人才能改變他們的目標(biāo)。因此，外國使節(jié)不可企望他的話會(huì)對(duì)蘇聯(lián)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)有所影響。他們至多能希望的是自己的話會(huì)被傳給蘇聯(lián)最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)階層，只有他們才能改變黨的路線。但是，這些人不可能會(huì)為資產(chǎn)階級(jí)代表通常的邏輯所動(dòng)搖。由于目標(biāo)不同，思維方式亦不可能一致。因此，事實(shí)比言辭對(duì)克里姆林宮更有說服力，只有以無可辨駁的事實(shí)作后盾的言辭，俄國人才聽得進(jìn)。

但是，我們已經(jīng)知道，意識(shí)形態(tài)并沒要求他們急于實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)。和教會(huì)一樣，他們只經(jīng)營意識(shí)形態(tài)概念（具有長遠(yuǎn)意義），可以耐心等待目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)。他們決不會(huì)為了虛幻的未來而冒喪失目前所得的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。列寧本人就教導(dǎo)說，追求共產(chǎn)主義目標(biāo)既要謹(jǐn)慎又要靈活。這種告誡由于俄國歷史上的教訓(xùn)更顯重要：在毫無防御的廣闊平原上與游牧民族進(jìn)行了幾個(gè)世紀(jì)的混戰(zhàn)，謹(jǐn)慎、考慮周全、靈活與欺詐是非常有用的品質(zhì)；這些品質(zhì)為俄羅斯和東方民族所崇尚。因此，俄國人并不因?yàn)樵诒茸约焊鼜?qiáng)大的敵手面前退卻而覺得丟面子。由于沒有一個(gè)達(dá)到目的的確定時(shí)間，他們不會(huì)為進(jìn)行必要的退卻而不安。俄國的政治行為就像一條不停流動(dòng)的溪流，朝著一個(gè)既定的目標(biāo)前進(jìn)。它主要關(guān)心的是灌滿世界權(quán)力盆地中可以達(dá)到的每一個(gè)角落和縫隙。如果在前進(jìn)的道路上遇到不可逾越的障礙，它會(huì)達(dá)觀地接受并適應(yīng)這一現(xiàn)實(shí)。重要的是永遠(yuǎn)朝著一個(gè)最終的目標(biāo)前進(jìn)。在蘇聯(lián)哲學(xué)中，并無一定要在一個(gè)確定時(shí)間內(nèi)實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)的思想。

因此，對(duì)付蘇聯(lián)外交比對(duì)付諸如拿破侖和希特勒等極富侵略性的首腦人物的外交既容易又困難。一方面，他們對(duì)敵手的力量更敏感，當(dāng)覺得對(duì)方力量太強(qiáng)大時(shí)，更愿意在外交上作出讓步，因此在權(quán)力邏輯與語言上更有理智。另一方面，敵方的一次勝利并不能擊敗他們或使他們喪失信心。由于它堅(jiān)定固執(zhí)，對(duì)付俄國不能靠偶而采取的、反映民主世界公眾輿論某個(gè)時(shí)候要求的行動(dòng)，而要執(zhí)行明智的、具有遠(yuǎn)見的政策——它在目標(biāo)堅(jiān)定、執(zhí)行中方式多樣與靈活應(yīng)變上都不比蘇聯(lián)的政策遜色。

在這種情形下，很清楚，美國對(duì)蘇政策最主要方面就是長期的、耐心但堅(jiān)定和保持警惕的對(duì)俄國擴(kuò)張傾向的遏制。應(yīng)當(dāng)指出，這種政策與裝腔作勢(shì)是不相容的，它并不等于威脅、恫嚇或擺出“強(qiáng)硬”的姿態(tài)。雖然說克里姆林宮對(duì)政治現(xiàn)實(shí)的反應(yīng)基本上是靈活的，但這決不意味著它會(huì)不顧自己的聲譽(yù)。跟幾乎所有其它政府一樣，蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)不會(huì)在笨拙的恫嚇行為面前退縮。俄國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人很了解人類的心理，他們知道大發(fā)脾氣和喪失自控決非政治活動(dòng)中力量的源泉。他們會(huì)極力利用敵方這種弱點(diǎn)。因此，為了有效地與俄國打交道，外國政府絕對(duì)必要在任何時(shí)候保持冷靜與鎮(zhèn)定，要以不易損害其威望的方式向俄國提出要求。

三

根據(jù)上面的分析，很清楚，蘇聯(lián)對(duì)西方世界自由制度的壓力，可以通過在一系列變化著的地理與政治點(diǎn)上，隨著俄國政策和手法的變化，靈活、保持警惕地使用反抗力量而被遏制，不能以魔力或勸說使之消失。俄國人期望萬古長存，并且看到自己已經(jīng)取得了巨大的成就。應(yīng)當(dāng)記住，曾經(jīng)有一個(gè)時(shí)期，共產(chǎn)黨在俄國國內(nèi)比蘇聯(lián)今天在世界更缺乏代表性。

如果說意識(shí)形態(tài)使俄國統(tǒng)治者認(rèn)為真理在他們一邊，他們可以耐心等待最終的勝利，那么我們則不受這種意識(shí)形態(tài)的約束，可以自由地、客觀地判斷這一論點(diǎn)是否站得住腳。蘇聯(lián)這一理論意味著它不僅完全不允許西方對(duì)其經(jīng)濟(jì)命脈的控制，而且設(shè)想俄國在很長時(shí)間能保持團(tuán)結(jié)、紀(jì)律和堅(jiān)韌不拔。把這種假定變?yōu)楝F(xiàn)實(shí)，如果西方以足夠的資源和力量對(duì)蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)遏制10一15年，這對(duì)俄國將意味著什么呢？

蘇聯(lián)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人利用現(xiàn)代技術(shù)給專制帶來的便利，使得人民在其政權(quán)下服服貼貼。很少有人對(duì)他們的權(quán)威進(jìn)行挑戰(zhàn)，就是有也都在國家鎮(zhèn)壓機(jī)關(guān)面前敗下陣來。

克里姆林宮亦證明自己能不顧居民的利益，在俄國建立起重工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)，雖然這一過程尚未完成，但是它仍在繼續(xù)發(fā)展中，并且日益接近主要工業(yè)國家的水平。所有這些，不管是維持國內(nèi)政治安全還是建立重工業(yè)，都是以人民生活受壓抑、期望未實(shí)現(xiàn)、精力被耗費(fèi)為代價(jià)的。它要求使用強(qiáng)迫勞動(dòng)，其規(guī)模與程度在和平時(shí)期的現(xiàn)代社會(huì)是空前的。它造成忽視和損害蘇聯(lián)經(jīng)濟(jì)生活的其他方面，特別是農(nóng)業(yè)、消費(fèi)品生產(chǎn)、住房建設(shè)與交通運(yùn)輸。

此外，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)又使得財(cái)產(chǎn)損失巨大、人員傷亡慘重和民眾疲憊不堪。所有這些，使得今天的蘇聯(lián)人在肉體和精神上都極為疲乏。人民群眾感到失望并且不再輕信上當(dāng)，如果說蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)在國外還有一些吸引力的話，那么它的國內(nèi)已經(jīng)不像過去那么具有魅力了。在戰(zhàn)時(shí)為了策略方面的原因而給予宗教的茍延殘喘的機(jī)會(huì)被人民以極大的熱情緊緊抓住了。這一事實(shí)雄辨地證明了人民對(duì)這個(gè)政權(quán)的目標(biāo)沒有表現(xiàn)出多少信仰和獻(xiàn)身的精神。

在這種情況下，人民的肉體與精神力量都是有一定限度的。如果超過了這個(gè)限度，就是最殘酷的獨(dú)裁政府也無法驅(qū)使他們。強(qiáng)制勞動(dòng)營地和其他強(qiáng)制機(jī)關(guān)以臨時(shí)性的條件強(qiáng)迫人民工作，勞動(dòng)時(shí)間超過了勞動(dòng)者意愿與單純的經(jīng)濟(jì)壓力所允許的范圍；即使他們能幸免于難，那時(shí)他們也已衰老了，成了獨(dú)裁的犧牲品。在上面任何一種情況下，他們最主要的力量都未能用于造福社會(huì)和為國家服務(wù)。

希望只有在年輕一代的身上。青年一代盡管歷盡磨難，但是他們數(shù)量眾、有活力；況且俄國民族是一個(gè)很有才能的民族。不過還有待于觀察兒童時(shí)代蘇聯(lián)獨(dú)裁政權(quán)施加的并隨戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)增長的精神壓力，于他們成年時(shí)的行為有什么樣的影響。除了最邊遠(yuǎn)地帶的農(nóng)場(chǎng)與村莊，諸如家園安全與和平的觀念在蘇聯(lián)已經(jīng)不存在了。至今尚不清楚，這是否對(duì)現(xiàn)在正在走向成熟的新的一代的全面能力產(chǎn)生影響。

另外，蘇聯(lián)經(jīng)濟(jì)雖取得了某些驚人的發(fā)展，但其發(fā)展是不平衡的、有缺陷的。說“資本主義發(fā)展不平衡”的俄國共產(chǎn)黨人，當(dāng)想想自己的國民經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況時(shí)，應(yīng)該覺得臉紅。蘇聯(lián)經(jīng)濟(jì)的某些部門如冶金和機(jī)器制造業(yè)所占的比重大大超過其他部門。當(dāng)它還沒有稱得上公路網(wǎng)的東西僅有一個(gè)原始的鐵路網(wǎng)時(shí)，就竟然想在短時(shí)間內(nèi)成為世界上的工業(yè)強(qiáng)國之一。他們雖然已做了不少工作努力提高勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率，教很原始的農(nóng)民一些機(jī)器操作常識(shí)，但是整個(gè)蘇聯(lián)經(jīng)濟(jì)嚴(yán)重管理不善，建設(shè)投資急、質(zhì)量次，折舊費(fèi)必須很大，在廣大的經(jīng)濟(jì)部門，尚未把西方熟練工人具有的生產(chǎn)觀念與技術(shù)自尊運(yùn)用于生產(chǎn)中。

很難相信，這些弊端可能為一個(gè)疲憊的、士氣低落的人民在短期內(nèi)所克服，他們?cè)诳謶趾蛪毫Φ年幱跋律睢Ｖ灰@些弊端未被克服，俄國就將仍然是一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)上脆弱的、并且在某種意義上虛弱的國家，它有能力出口它的熱情和發(fā)出那種奇怪的政治魅力，但是不能維持那些靠真正的物質(zhì)力量和繁榮的產(chǎn)品的出口。

同時(shí)，蘇聯(lián)政治生活也極不穩(wěn)定。這種不穩(wěn)定是由于權(quán)力從一個(gè)人或集團(tuán)轉(zhuǎn)移到另一個(gè)人或集團(tuán)而形成的。

這主要是斯大林個(gè)人地位問題。我們應(yīng)當(dāng)知道，斯大林代替列寧成為共產(chǎn)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的領(lǐng)袖，僅僅是蘇聯(lián)第一次個(gè)人權(quán)威的轉(zhuǎn)移。這一轉(zhuǎn)移花了12年時(shí)間才鞏固下來。它使得上百萬人喪生，從根本上沖擊了這個(gè)國家。其影響達(dá)及整個(gè)國際革命運(yùn)動(dòng)，極不利于克里姆林宮自己。

有可能下一次最高權(quán)力轉(zhuǎn)移會(huì)是靜悄悄的、不惹人注目的，不會(huì)引起其它地區(qū)的反響。但是用列寧的話來說，這很可能促成從“巧妙的欺詐”到“野蠻的暴力”的迅速轉(zhuǎn)變，這是俄國歷史的特點(diǎn)，它將從根本上動(dòng)搖蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)的基礎(chǔ)。

但這不僅僅是斯大林本人的問題。自從1938年以來，蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)高級(jí)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)階層中，政治生活就有著危險(xiǎn)的死氣沉沉的局面。理論上說，全俄蘇維埃代表大會(huì)是黨的最高權(quán)力機(jī)構(gòu)，至少每三年開一次會(huì)。然而，從上次代表大會(huì)以來已經(jīng)塊整整八年沒開會(huì)了。在此期間，黨員數(shù)量增加了一倍。戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中大量的黨員喪生；今天一半以上的黨員是在上次黨代會(huì)以后被吸收的。而同時(shí)，在民族經(jīng)歷了劇烈的變動(dòng)后，仍然是原來一小批人踞于最高地位。確實(shí)，有某些原因使戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)給西方每個(gè)大國的政府帶來了根本的政治變動(dòng)，造成這種現(xiàn)象的原因也基本上存在于費(fèi)解的蘇聯(lián)政治生活中，但是，這些原因在俄國尚未得到承認(rèn)。

即使在像共產(chǎn)黨這樣具有高度紀(jì)律的組織里，大批只是最近參加共產(chǎn)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的黨員群眾與終身踞于最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的小集團(tuán)之間在年齡、觀點(diǎn)和利益上的差異也勢(shì)必?cái)U(kuò)大，大部分黨員群眾從未見過這些最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，從未與他們談過話，也不可能與他們有密切的政治聯(lián)系。

在這種情況下，誰能肯定黨的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)新老交替（其發(fā)生只是時(shí)間問題）能夠順利地、和平地進(jìn)行，或者競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手們不會(huì)為了自己的目標(biāo)而尋求這些尚未成熟的、缺乏經(jīng)驗(yàn)的群眾的支持？如果真的出現(xiàn)這種情況，將產(chǎn)生難以想象的后果，因?yàn)橐话阏f來全體黨員歷來習(xí)慣于鐵的紀(jì)律與服從而不適應(yīng)妥協(xié)與和解。如果團(tuán)結(jié)遭破壞從而使黨癱瘓，俄國社會(huì)將會(huì)出現(xiàn)難以描述的混亂和虛弱。因?yàn)槲覀冎溃K聯(lián)政權(quán)只是裝著一群烏合之眾的容器外殼而已。在俄國根本沒有地方政府這類東西。目前這一代的俄國人從不知道自發(fā)的集體行為。假如出現(xiàn)一些情況，破壞了作為政治工具的黨的團(tuán)結(jié)與效率，那么蘇聯(lián)很可能會(huì)在一夜之間，由一個(gè)最強(qiáng)大的國家變?yōu)橐粋€(gè)最弱的、最可憐的國家之一。

因此，蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)的未來根本不會(huì)像克里姆林宮主義所幻想的那么安全。他們表明自己能夠保持政權(quán)。他們能否平靜地、順利地完成政權(quán)的新老交替，尚有待證明。同時(shí)，國內(nèi)政權(quán)的淫威和國際生活的動(dòng)蕩己經(jīng)嚴(yán)重地挫傷了該政權(quán)賴以依靠的偉大的人民，使他們喪失了希望。十分令人驚奇的是，今天，蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)的意識(shí)形態(tài)力量在俄國境外即在它的警察力量所及的范圍之外，其影響更大。這種現(xiàn)象使人想起托馬斯·曼在他的著名的小說《布登勃洛克一家》④中所用的一個(gè)比喻。托馬斯·曼認(rèn)為，人類組織在其內(nèi)部已經(jīng)嚴(yán)重衰敗時(shí)，往往外表上顯得十分強(qiáng)盛，他把處于極盛時(shí)期的布登勃洛克一家比作一顆向地球發(fā)著最亮的光但事實(shí)上早已不存在的星體之一。誰敢否認(rèn)，克里姆林宮灑向西方世界失望不滿的人民的強(qiáng)光不是事實(shí)上行將消失的星座的余輝？既不能證明是這樣，也不能證明不是這樣。但是存在這么一種可能性（作者認(rèn)為這種可能性很大），即蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)，正像他們所說的資本主義世界，本身包含著衰敗的種子，這個(gè)種子已經(jīng)萌芽滋長。

四

顯然，美國不可指望在可見的將來與蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)保持密切的關(guān)系。在政治舞臺(tái)上，應(yīng)繼續(xù)將蘇聯(lián)當(dāng)作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手而非伙伴。蘇聯(lián)今后不可能真心熱愛和平與穩(wěn)定、不相信社會(huì)主義世界和資本主義世界可以長期地、友好地共處，而是謹(jǐn)慎地、不懈地施加壓力，削弱與瓦解所有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的影響與力量。

然而，俄國雖然總的說來是敵視西方的，但是至今它仍是相對(duì)弱的國家，它的政策很靈活，蘇聯(lián)社會(huì)包含著衰敗的種子。這就要求美國對(duì)堅(jiān)定的遏制政策充滿信心，在俄國人露出侵害世界和平與穩(wěn)定跡象的每一個(gè)點(diǎn)上，使用不可更改的反擊力量。

但是實(shí)際上，美國的政策并不是純粹的維持現(xiàn)狀以及守株待兔。美國安全可能通過自己的行動(dòng)影響俄國內(nèi)部乃至整個(gè)國際共產(chǎn)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的發(fā)展（俄國政策主要依此而制定）。這不單單指在蘇聯(lián)及其它地方搞些情報(bào)活動(dòng)，盡管這也很重要。最主要的是，美國要在世界民眾中樹立這樣一個(gè)印象：目標(biāo)明確、能夠成功地解決國內(nèi)生活中的問題、可以承擔(dān)起一個(gè)世界強(qiáng)國的責(zé)任和在目前幾個(gè)主要的意識(shí)形態(tài)潮流面前保持自己的信念。倘若做到這一點(diǎn)，俄國共產(chǎn)主義目標(biāo)就如堂吉柯德想法無望實(shí)現(xiàn)，莫斯科追隨者們的希望與熱情必逐漸減退，將給克里姆林宮對(duì)外政策增加新的困難。因?yàn)橘Y本主義必然衰亡的神話是共產(chǎn)主義哲學(xué)的基石。甚至二戰(zhàn)以后，美國并未經(jīng)歷紅場(chǎng)烏鴉們所預(yù)言的一場(chǎng)衰退，這一事實(shí)就將引起共產(chǎn)主義世界強(qiáng)大的、深遠(yuǎn)的反響。

同樣地，如果美國表現(xiàn)出優(yōu)柔寡斷、紛爭(zhēng)不和以及內(nèi)部分裂的跡象，這也將極大地鼓舞整個(gè)共產(chǎn)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)。如果上述任何一種傾向出現(xiàn)的話，共產(chǎn)主義世界將大受鼓舞、興高采烈；莫斯科會(huì)顯得得意洋洋；莫斯科在國外的支持者將增加；以及大大加強(qiáng)莫斯科在國際事務(wù)中的影響。

說美國單獨(dú)就能對(duì)共產(chǎn)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的命運(yùn)起決定性的作用并很快使蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)在俄國垮臺(tái)，這是夸大其詞的。但是美國確實(shí)能夠?qū)μK聯(lián)的政策施加極大的壓力，迫使克姆林宮的行為要比近年所為更加溫和與明智，從而最后導(dǎo)致俄國政權(quán)的垮臺(tái)或逐漸軟化。因?yàn)椋魏紊衩氐木仁肋\(yùn)動(dòng)—特別是克里姆林宮的救世運(yùn)動(dòng)—如果不使自己適應(yīng)于事態(tài)發(fā)展的邏輯，就必然遇到挫敗。

因此，決定權(quán)很大程度上落在美國的身上。蘇美關(guān)系從本質(zhì)上是對(duì)作為世界民族之一的美國的價(jià)值之考驗(yàn)。為了避免毀滅，美國只需達(dá)到其民族之最好傳統(tǒng)，并證明值得作為一個(gè)偉大的民族而生存下去。

確實(shí)，沒有比這樣對(duì)民族素質(zhì)的考驗(yàn)更公平的了。在這種情況下，有頭腦的蘇美關(guān)系觀察家沒有理由埋怨克里姆林宮對(duì)美國的挑戰(zhàn)。他應(yīng)當(dāng)感謝上帝，上帝使美國人民受到這種無法改變的挑戰(zhàn)，從而使美國全民族的安全依賴于他們的團(tuán)結(jié)及接受歷史要求他們負(fù)有的道義和政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的責(zé)任。

注釋：

①列寧：《論歐洲聯(lián)邦的口號(hào)》，1915年8月，《列寧全集》中譯本第21卷第321頁，1959年人民出版社。
②愛德華·吉本，1737一1794，英國歷史學(xué)家。——譯注。
③本文之“社會(huì)主義”指馬克思主義者或列寧主義者的社會(huì)主義，不是第二國際的自由社會(huì)主義。——原注。
④托馬斯·曼，1875—1955，二十世紀(jì)最杰出的德國小說家，1929獲諾貝爾文學(xué)獎(jiǎng)，1944年加入美國國籍。1900年他因小說《布登勃洛克一家》問世而一舉成名。這部小說描寫一個(gè)資產(chǎn)階級(jí)家庭三代人和他們商號(hào)的興衰史。——譯注。

譯文原載《政治研究》1988年第1期

The Sources of Soviet Conduct
By “X” (George F. Kennan)

I

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.

It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts with which the Soviet leaders came into power. Marxian ideology, in its Russian-Communist projection, has always been in process of subtle evolution. The materials on which it bases itself are extensive and complex. But the outstanding features of Communist thought as it existed in 1916 may perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of public life and the “physiognomy of society,” is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged; (b) that the capitalist system of production is a nefarious one which inevitable leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class and is incapable of developing adequately the economic resources of society or of distributing fairly the material good produced by human labor; (c) that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and must, in view of the inability of the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change, result eventually and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power to the working class; and (d) that imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution.

The rest may be outlined in Lenin’s own words: “Unevenness of economic and political development is the inflexible law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of Socialism may come originally in a few capitalist countries or even in a single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and having organized Socialist production at home, would rise against the remaining capitalist world, drawing to itself in the process the oppressed classes of other countries.” [see endnote 1] It must be noted that there was no assumption that capitalism would perish without proletarian revolution. A final push was needed from a revolutionary proletariat movement in order to tip over the tottering structure. But it was regarded as inevitable that sooner of later that push be given.

For 50 years prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, this pattern of thought had exercised great fascination for the members of the Russian revolutionary movement. Frustrated, discontented, hopeless of finding self-expression — or too impatient to seek it — in the confining limits of the Tsarist political system, yet lacking wide popular support or their choice of bloody revolution as a means of social betterment, these revolutionists found in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalization for their own instinctive desires. It afforded pseudo-scientific justification for their impatience, for their categoric denial of all value in the Tsarist system, for their yearning for power and revenge and for their inclination to cut corners in the pursuit of it. It is therefore no wonder that they had come to believe implicitly in the truth and soundness of the Marxist-Leninist teachings, so congenial to their own impulses and emotions. Their sincerity need not be impugned. This is a phenomenon as old as human nature itself. It is has never been more aptly described than by Edward Gibbon, who wrote in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: “From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance of how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud.” And it was with this set of conceptions that the members of the Bolshevik Party entered into power.

Now it must be noted that through all the years of preparation for revolution, the attention of these men, as indeed of Marx himself, had been centered less on the future form which Socialism [see endnote 2] would take than on the necessary overthrow of rival power which, in their view, had to precede the introduction of Socialism. Their views, therefore, on the positive program to be put into effect, once power was attained, were for the most part nebulous, visionary and impractical. beyond the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large private capital holdings there was no agreed program. The treatment of the peasantry, which, according to the Marxist formulation was not of the proletariat, had always been a vague spot in the pattern of Communist thought: and it remained an object of controversy and vacillation for the first ten years of Communist power.

The circumstances of the immediate post-revolution period — the existence in Russia of civil war and foreign intervention, together with the obvious fact that the Communists represented only a tiny minority of the Russian people — made the establishment of dictatorial power a necessity. The experiment with war Communism” and the abrupt attempt to eliminate private production and trade had unfortunate economic consequences and caused further bitterness against the new revolutionary regime. While the temporary relaxation of the effort to communize Russia, represented by the New Economic Policy, alleviated some of this economic distress and thereby served its purpose, it also made it evident that the “capitalistic sector of society” was still prepared to profit at once from any relaxation of governmental pressure, and would, if permitted to continue to exist, always constitute a powerful opposing element to the Soviet regime and a serious rival for influence in the country. Somewhat the same situation prevailed with respect to the individual peasant who, in his own small way, was also a private producer.

Lenin, had he lived, might have proved a great enough man to reconcile these conflicting forces to the ultimate benefit of Russian society, thought this is questionable. But be that as it may, Stalin, and those whom he led in the struggle for succession to Lenin’s position of leadership, were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted. Their sense of insecurity was too great. Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire “rightness,” they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. Outside the Communist Party, Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to be no forms of collective human activity or association which would not be dominated by the Party. No other force in Russian society was to be permitted to achieve vitality or integrity. Only the Party was to have structure. All else was to be an amorphous mass.

And within the Party the same principle was to apply. The mass of Party members might go through the motions of election, deliberation, decision and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by their own individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership and the overbrooding presence of “the word.”

Let it be stressed again that subjectively these men probably did not seek absolutism for its own sake. They doubtless believed — and found it easy to believe — that they alone knew what was good for society and that they would accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallengeable. But in seeking that security of their own rule they were prepared to recognize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods. And until such time as that security might be achieved, they placed far down on their scale of operational priorities the comforts and happiness of the peoples entrusted to their care.

Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet regime is that down to the present day this process of political consolidation has never been completed and the men in the Kremlin have continued to be predominantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized in November 1917. They have endeavored to secure it primarily against forces at home, within Soviet society itself. But they have also endeavored to secure it against the outside world. For ideology, as we have seen, taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders. Then powerful hands of Russian history and tradition reached up to sustain them in this feeling. Finally, their own aggressive intransigence with respect to the outside world began to find its own reaction; and they were soon forced, to use another Gibbonesque phrase, “to chastise the contumacy” which they themselves had provoked. It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right.

Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element, part of the blame for the maintenance of a dictatorial form of society. But as these remnants were liquidated, little by little, this justification fell away, and when it was indicated officially that they had been finally destroyed, it disappeared altogether. And this fact created one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad.

This began at an early date. In 1924 Stalin specifically defended the retention of the “organs of suppression,” meaning, among others, the army and the secret police, on the ground that “as long as there is a capitalistic encirclement there will be danger of intervention with all the consequences that flow from that danger.” In accordance with that theory, and from that time on, all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power.

By the same token, tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. It is clear, from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded in reality. The real facts concerning it have been confused by the existence abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet philosophy and tactics and occasionally by the existence of great centers of military power, notably the Nazi regime in Germany and the Japanese Government of the late 1930s, which indeed have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union. But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.

Now the maintenance of this pattern of Soviet power, namely, the pursuit of unlimited authority domestically, accompanied by the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility, has gone far to shape the actual machinery of Soviet power as we know it today. Internal organs of administration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine. Organs which did serve this purpose became vastly swollen. The security of Soviet power came to rest on the iron discipline of the Party, on the severity and ubiquity of the secret police, and on the uncompromising economic monopolism of the state. The “organs of suppression,” in which the Soviet leaders had sought security from rival forces, became in large measures the masters of those whom they were designed to serve. Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings who form that part of the structure of power must defend at all costs this concept of Russia’s position, for without it they are themselves superfluous.

As things stand today, the rulers can no longer dream of parting with these organs of suppression. The quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in modern times, has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own reaction. The excesses of the police apparatus have fanned the potential opposition to the regime into something far greater and more dangerous than it could have been before those excesses began.

But least of all can the rulers dispense with the fiction by which the maintenance of dictatorial power has been defended. For this fiction has been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses already committed in its name; and it is now anchored in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds far greater than those of mere ideology.

II

So much for the historical background. What does it spell in terms of the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today?

Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it.

The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia’s conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow’s side an sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must inevitably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet government occasionally sets it signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin’s conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that “the Russians have changed,” and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such “changes.” But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.

This means we are going to continue for long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing the final coup de gr?ce. meanwhile, what is vital is that the “Socialist fatherland” — that oasis of power which has already been won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union — should be cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of premature, “adventuristic” revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even a counter-revolutionary act. The cause of Socialism is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow.

This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit.

The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously.

On the principle of infallibility there rests the iron discipline of the Communist Party. In fact, the two concepts are mutually self-supporting. Perfect discipline requires recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires the observance of discipline. And the two go far to determine the behaviorism of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their effect cannot be understood unless a third factor be taken into account: namely, the fact that the leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of that thesis by the members of the movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, from month to month. It is nothing absolute and immutable — nothing which flows from objective reality. It is only the most recent manifestation of the wisdom of those in whom the ultimate wisdom is supposed to reside, because they represent the logic of history. The accumulative effect of these factors is to give to the whole subordinate apparatus of Soviet power an unshakable stubbornness and steadfastness in its orientation. This orientation can be changed at will by the Kremlin but by no other power. Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force. The individuals who are the components of this machine are unamenable to argument or reason, which comes to them from outside sources. Their whole training has taught them to mistrust and discount the glib persuasiveness of the outside world. Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the “master’s voice.” And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off. Thus the foreign representative cannot hope that his words will make any impression on them. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top, who are capable of changing the party line. But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity.

But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds a natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior forces. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.

These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only be intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia’s adversaries — policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward “toughness.” While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.

III

In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community.

But if the ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and they they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself?

The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern techniques to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state.

The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, and industrial foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this, however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers’ goods production, housing and transportation.

To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is physically and spiritually tired. The mass of the people are disillusioned, skeptical and no longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which people seized upon the slight respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes of the regime.

In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work longer hours than their own volition or mere economic pressure would dictate; but if people survive them at all they become old before their time and must be considered as human casualties to the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no longer available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state.

Here only the younger generations can help. The younger generation, despite all vicissitudes and sufferings, is numerous and vigorous; and the Russians are a talented people. But it still remains to be seen what will be the effects on mature performance of the abnormal emotional strains of childhood which Soviet dictatorship created and which were enormously increased by the war. Such things as normal security and placidity of home environment have practically ceased to exist in the Soviet Union outside of the most remote farms and villages. And observers are not yet sure whether that is not going to leave its mark on the over-all capacity of the generation now coming into maturity.

In addition to this, we have the fact that Soviet economic development, while it can list certain formidable achievements, has been precariously spotty and uneven. Russian Communists who speak of the “uneven development of capitalism” should blush at the contemplation of their own national economy. Here certain branches of economic life, such as the metallurgical and machine industries, have been pushed out of all proportion to other sectors of economy. Here is a nation striving to become in a short period one of the great industrial nations of the world while it still has no highway network worthy of the name and only a relatively primitive network of railways. Much has been done to increase efficiency of labor and to teach primitive peasants something about the operation of machines. But maintenance is still a crying deficiency of all Soviet economy. Construction is hasty and poor in quality. Depreciation must be enormous. And in vast sectors of economic life it has not yet been possible to instill into labor anything like that general culture of production and technical self-respect which characterizes the skilled worker of the west.

It is difficult to see how these deficiencies can be corrected at an early date by a tired and dispirited population working largely under the shadow of fear and compulsion. And as long as they are not overcome, Russia will remain economically as vulnerable, and in a certain sense an impotent, nation, capable of exporting its enthusiasms and of radiating the strange charm of its primitive political vitality but unable to back up those articles of export by the real evidences of material power and prosperity.

Meanwhile, a great uncertainty hangs over the political life of the Soviet Union. That is the uncertainty involved in the transfer of power from one individual or group of individuals to others.

This is, of course, outstandingly the problem of the personal position of Stalin. We must remember that his succession to Lenin’s pinnacle of pre-eminence in the Communist movement was the only such transfer of individual authority which the Soviet Union has experienced. That transfer took 12 years to consolidate. It cost the lives of millions of people and shook the state to its foundations. The attendant tremors were felt all through the international revolutionary movement, to the disadvantage of the Kremlin itself.

It is always possible that another transfer of pre-eminent power may take place quietly and inconspicuously, with no repercussions anywhere. But again, it is possible that the questions involved may unleash, to use some of Lenin’s words, one of those “incredibly swift transitions” from “delicate deceit” to “wild violence” which characterize Russian history, and may shake Soviet power to its foundations.

But this is not only a question of Stalin himself. There has been, since 1938, a dangerous congealment of political life in the higher circles of Soviet power. The All-Union Congress of Soviets, in theory the supreme body of the Party, is supposed to meet not less often than once in three years. It will soon be eight full years since its last meeting. During this period membership in the Party has numerically doubled. Party mortality during the war was enormous; and today well over half of the Party members are persons who have entered since the last Party congress was held. meanwhile, the same small group of men has carried on at the top through an amazing series of national vicissitudes. Surely there is some reason why the experiences of the war brought basic political changes to every one of the great governments of the west. Surely the causes of that phenomenon are basic enough to be present somewhere in the obscurity of Soviet political life, as well. And yet no recognition has been given to these causes in Russia.

It must be surmised from this that even within so highly disciplined an organization as the Communist Party there must be a growing divergence in age, outlook and interest between the great mass of Party members, only so recently recruited into the movement, and the little self-perpetuating clique of men at the top, whom most of these Party members have never met, with whom they have never conversed, and with whom they can have no political intimacy.

Who can say whether, in these circumstances, the eventual rejuvenation of the higher spheres of authority (which can only be a matter of time) can take place smoothly and peacefully, or whether rivals in the quest for higher power will not eventually reach down into these politically immature and inexperienced masses in order to find support for their respective claims? If this were ever to happen, strange consequences could flow for the Communist Party: for the membership at large has been exercised only in the practices of iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation. And if disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description. For we have seen that Soviet power is only concealing an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.

Thus the future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self-delusion would make it appear to the men of the Kremlin. That they can quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of their rule and the vicissitudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength and hopes of the great people on whom their power rests. It is curious to note that the ideological power of Soviet authority is strongest today in areas beyond the frontiers of Russia, beyond the reach of its police power. This phenomenon brings to mind a comparison used by Thomas Mann in his great novel Buddenbrooks. Observing that human institutions often show the greatest outward brilliance at a moment when inner decay is in reality farthest advanced, he compared one of those stars whose light shines most brightly on this world when in reality it has long since ceased to exist. And who can say with assurance that the strong light still cast by the Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples of the western world is not the powerful afterglow of a constellation which is in actuality on the wane? This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved. But the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.

IV

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and, weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.

But in actuality the possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question of the modest measure of informational activity which this government can conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although that, too, is important. It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problem of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow’s supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin’s foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy. Even the failure of the United States to experience the early economic depression which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting with such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.

By the same token, exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement goes through the Communist world; a new jauntiness can be noted in the Moscow tread; new groups of foreign supporters climb on to what they can only view as the band wagon of international politics; and Russian pressure increases all along the line in international affairs.

It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, Messianic movement — and particularly not that of the Kremlin — can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.

Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin’s challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

[1] “Concerning the Slogans of the United States of Europe,” August 1915. Official Soviet edition of Lenin’s works

[2] Here and elsewhere in this paper “Socialism refers to Marxist or Leninst Communism, not to liberal Socialism of the Second International variety.

Foreign Affairs, July 1947

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